The seven deadly sins of Bank al Maghrib

By Mohammed Benmoussa, economist and vice-president of the Damir association

Great must be mistrust when on a particular subject, dominates unanimity. Often a reflection of a renunciation of questioning and critical thinking, it equally embodies the submission to an imbalanced balance of power. The question of the Moroccan central bank is a perfect illustration of this observation. In the reign of a quasi consensus on monetary and macro-prudential policy, there is only one necessity to oppose, the truth, there is only one force to claim, the right, there only one interest to be privileged, that of citizens and economic agents. With the exception of very few voices, including that of the High Commissioner of the Plan and your modest servant, who proclaim loud and clear the collateral damage of the policy of the institute of emission, force is to recognize that almost everything the world is at the pinnacle the management of the governor of the central bank. First, the bank presidents themselves who are subject to his control and whose appointment is conditional on his favorable opinion. Then, the political leaders, government and parliamentary representatives of the nation, who refrain from any attempt to exercise power over Bank al Maghrib, fearing to violate the sacrosanct principle of independence of the central bank or encroach on royal prerogatives. Finally, the so-called specialized media who participate docilely and naively in the ritual of the quarterly press conference, without managing to overcome their inability to challenge monetary policy decisions or to bring a constructive contradiction to the governor.

Mohammed Benmoussa, economist. MOHAMED DRISSI KAMILI / THE DESK

To avoid any ambiguity, I must say right now that it is not the person of Abdellatif Jouahri who is questioned, but it is his policy. This must be reconsidered and evaluated in terms of its contribution to the economic and social prosperity of Moroccans. Everyone recognizes, me first, that he is a loyal statesman, who has given a lot for his country. He was an excellent Minister of the Economy and Finance at the time when the Kingdom went through the storm of the structural adjustment program in 1983, then after a course in the private bank and the activity of mutual retirement, it becomes in 2003 the central banker of Morocco. Monetary policy therefore bears its mark almost since the reign of King Mohammed VI. The feats of arms of Jouahri are indisputable and, as such, recognition is due to him by the nation. Should we today be adorned with an enamored feeling about the monetary and macro-prudential policy that it leads? The answer is unquestionably no. Several arguments come to mind to demonstrate this …

Well-ordered charity begins with oneself– even

The governor's statements during press briefings, as well as the central bank's annual reports to the Head of State, are full of harsh criticism of government policies. Well Named ! All opportunities are seized by the central bank to warn of the sluggish economic growth, the lack of dynamism of non-agricultural activities or the weakness of job creation. The widening of twin deficits and public debt, the delay in the reform of the education and training system or the worrisome state of private investment, characterized by a tissue of weak and weakened "The informal, unfair practices, corruption and delays in payment" are among the evils denounced by the governor. And to add that "The governance of public policy in our country suffers from several shortcomings related to the lack of coherence, effectiveness in implementation and objective evaluation".

Mohammed VI receiving at the Royal Palace, Abdellatif Jouahri, Wali Bank Al-Maghrib, who presented to the sovereign the annual report of the Central Bank on the economic, monetary and financial situation. MAP

What is striking in this indictment is the prolixity of Bank al Maghrib on fiscal policy, budget, growth, education or employment, but the total lack of self-criticism on the conduct of politics monetary and macro-prudential, as if there was only one absolute truth in the matter. As if the central bank's policy produced stunning results, which would exempt it from evaluation and accountability. This absence of parallelism of forms in the critical analysis of the components of economic policy must challenge us. At the top of the show, there is no room for doubt! Yet, Aristotelian thought should remind us all that " Doubt is the beginning of wisdom ". However, the modest results of the national economy, whose sources of underperformance also come from the way money and credit are managed, should lead us to be more cautious. In matters of monetary policy, and of economic policy more generally, certainty is the nudity of thought, it is the domination of belief, it is the failure of demonstration. There is nothing more terrible for the economy of a country. And finally, if the central bank remains inhabited by its monetary certainties, it is legitimate in a democracy to question who is entitled to control its policy and evaluate its performance.

A slow fading of the original spirit of the Bank of Morocco

When the Bank of Morocco, ancestor of Bank al Maghrib, was created in July 1959 by the late Abderrahim Bouabid, Minister of the National Economy and Finance of the time, he made a founding speech by which he proclaimed, not without a certain pride but also with a contained anger, a new act of sovereignty of Morocco four years after the agreements of Aix-les-Bains, the return of the king Mohammed V of the exile and the proclamation of the independence of Morocco. The historic leader of the Socialist Party considered that the right to mint money is a sovereign right par excellence of a State and represents "The basic expression of the political and economic independence of a modern state". He emphasized the urgency of "A monetary policy at the service of social balance and economic expansion". Observing that a healthy and stable currency could only be envisaged in a healthy economy, he concluded by saying that"One can not, without serious risk, conceive systematically and absolute that the currency constitutes the unique instrument of economic and financial direction ". Ideas that today retain all their strength, relevance and freshness, and which radically contrast with a narrow conception of monetary policy focused exclusively on the level of inflation.

A narrow vision of monetary policy

The Moroccan political class has shown a form of intellectual laziness or a certain naivety, voting in chorus Bill 40-17 amending the statutes of Bank al Maghrib entered into force in July 2019. Let them Great decision-makers of the high public administration do their work, she must think, forcing herself to a form of contrition, she who is delivered to the popular vengeance in the posture of idlers, mocked, booed, insulted, just good to shut up. This text, which was passed as a letter to the post office, had the peculiarity of redefining the primary mission of the central bank, stating that price stability is now erected as the main objective. Exit the objectives of economic stability, support for growth and job creation! The control of inflation in Morocco becomes the alpha and the omega of monetary policy, forgetting in passing the prophetic message of a giant of Moroccan politics and founder of the central bank, the late Abderrahim Bouabid. This great silence on the economic and social role of money and bank lending arises in our country, just when the main foreign central banks are doing exactly the opposite way under the pressure of the global economic crisis born of the scandal of subprime and the sovereign debt crisis that resulted.

The Federal Reserve Act which in December 1913 created the Federal Reserve System (FED), states that the mission of the US central bank is to maintain "On average a growth of monetary aggregates and the amount of credit compatible with the growth potential of production", in order to reach three objectives: a maximum employment rate, stable prices and low long-term interest rates. Notice the order of presentation of the objectives, reflecting a certain hierarchy. The Central Bank of England has a hierarchical mandate whereby it is primarily required to focus on price stability and, if successful, to support economic policy by promoting growth and employment. . Article 4 of the so-called 1998 Law Bank of Japan Act indicates that in conducting its monetary and exchange rate policies, the Bank of Japan will always have to coordinate with the Japanese government's economic policy. Strongly imbued with the Orthodox culture of the Bundestag, the statutes of the ECB (European Central Bank), protected by the Treaty of the European Union of 1992 (Maastricht Treaty), give it an almost exclusive mission to fight against inflation. and the financial stability of the euro area. But this statutory framework is largely undermined in fact, the ECB Mario Draghi having engaged in a vast program of quantitative easing (Q.E.) under the pressure of public opinion and governments in place.

Bank Al-Maghrib. MOHAMED DRISSI KAMILI / THE DESK

Today, despite the duality of their main objective, the control of inflation and economic stability, the big central banks are questioning their mission and their monetary policy doctrine. The US Federal Reserve has already launched a debate on this subject by holding public debates in the various states until mid-2020 and the ECB should follow suit as soon as Christine Lagarde arrives at the responsibilities. As they fail to reach their inflation target of 2% despite their accommodative monetary policy and their so-called unconventional instruments (negative key rates, buy-backs of public and private debt, etc.), the major central banks are studying other alternatives. to their monetary policy as the change of inflation target, the targeting of a nominal GDP …

Against the international conception of independence

Among the other novelties of the aforementioned law 40-17, are the role of the Moroccan central bank in defining and conducting monetary policy, as well as the provisions devoting its independence in connection with the tightening of the system of incompatibilities or the prohibition of the wali of Bank al Maghrib and any member of its Council to receive or request instructions from the Government or any third party. While the independence of the management team or the prevention of conflicts of interest is beneficial for the credibility of the central bank, the same is not true of the definition of monetary policy, which is now in the hands of the central bank. those who are responsible for its implementation. This concentration of monetary power poses several problems of an ethical, political and economic nature.

The Moroccan legislator like Bank al Maghrib seems to forget that the notion of independence of central banks appeared the first time in the late 1980s and during the 1990s in reaction to the inflationary pressures that crossed the economies of the planet and to prevent the monetization of public debts. The current context is totally different, the risk faced by national economies, including Morocco, being disinflation, deflation, deceleration of growth, decay and structural unemployment. Ignoring macroeconomic risks to demonstrate independence from political power would be counterproductive for Bank al Maghrib in the long run, as it is for any other central bank. And then, this independence does not protect against financial risks, since it seems established that the monetary policy led by Alan Greenspan would be one of the causes of the subprime crisis. By keeping interest rates low enough, it would have contributed to the formation of a real estate and financial bubble, then would have favored its break-up by the tightening of credit conditions from 2006, justified by the return of inflationary pressures. . There is therefore doubt about the ability of an independent central bank to conduct a monetary policy limiting the amplitude of economic cycles.

Moreover, the requirement of independence of the central bank must be exercisable with regard to the government, and not the state. In fact, monetary policy decisions must be coordinated with other economic policy decisions of the government and the Ministry of the Economy and Finance more precisely, without being subject to them. This is due to the credibility of the national currency, the soundness of the financial system, the control of inflationary risk, but also the attractiveness of the Moroccan territory and the stability of economic and social balances. While government decisions may be the result of political considerations and electoral agendas to which Bank al-Maghrib has the institutional obligation not to submit, the same is not true of Parliament, which represents the sovereign will of the Moroccan people with all their political sensitivities and participates in the incarnation of the authority of the state. Monetary policy must therefore be discussed in the House of Representatives, both in the Finance Committee and in the Plenary, and, if necessary, be amended. And it is to the representatives of the people, and to them alone, that the power to decide the monetary policy choices comes back. The great democracies have not been mistaken. In the United States, as in Britain, the people's representatives exercise a keen control over monetary policy decisions. The United States Constitution entrusted Congress with power " to strike money and set the value " and the monetary authority is only delegated by the Congress to the FED, whose president is required to report twice a year to the Congress to present a report on the state of the economy, to explain its monetary policy and to justify its economic forecasts in the short and medium term. Not to mention the fact that the Congress can at any time, if it wishes, modify the statute or the mandate of the FED. Equivalent to the Minister of Finance, the Chancellor of the Exchequer sets the monetary policy targets in the United Kingdom and sets an annual inflation target of 2%. The Governor of the Bank of England, subject to a hierarchical mandate, must write an open letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to explain deviations of more or less 1% from the official forecasts and propose corrective measures in matters monetary policy and credit policy. The Bank of Japan is, in fact, under the authority of the government without any hint of independence. The head of the Japanese central bank is a former finance ministry official who leads the monetary policy in agreement with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

Finally, the independence of a central bank presupposes prerequisites that are far from being satisfied in Morocco. To claim complete independence in its decisions, a central bank must demonstrate a four-fold transparency, political, economic, procedural and operational, as a guarantee of its effectiveness. Political transparency on the objectives of monetary policy, which is acquired in Morocco with the new statutes of Bank al Maghrib. But also an economic transparency on the dissemination of data, forecasts and models used in the monetary decision process. Procedural transparency informing economic agents and public opinion of how decisions are made. Operational transparency providing information on the minutes of the meetings of the Central Bank Council and the detailed votes, on the errors and unexpected events that have enmeshed the implementation of monetary policy. It must be acknowledged that Bank al-Maghrib is still in the infancy stage with regard to these transparency requirements. The simple press release issued at the end of each quarterly meeting and the press conference held by the governor under the conditions that we know, do not allow to know if the decisions of the Council are truly collegial, all the more that we are facing a deafening silence of the members of the Council, of which we do not know the ideas, nor the level of control of the problems of monetary and macro-prudential policy. The closed meeting of the governor with the Finance Committee, after which no monetary policy amendment was introduced, confirms this feeling of opacity and unanimity. At the opposite of this pattern is the European model where the President of the ECB holds the Governing Council meeting twice a month and comes to the floor four times a year before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the Strasbourg Parliament. Or the model of the Fed that publishes a detailed account of the discussions of the Monetary Policy Committee, or that of the Bank of England which disseminates the individual votes.

An allegedly accommodative monetary policy

The Moroccan central bank likes to say that it spared no effort to deploy an accommodative monetary policy, able to revive bank credit. It puts forward several arguments for this: a gradual decline from March 2012 in the key interest rate by 100 basis points to 2.25% (March 2016), a decrease in the monetary reserve to 2%, the introduction of longer term refinancing operations (3 months) in the form of repurchase agreements, loans guaranteed by private effects intended for the SME, expansion of the collateral eligible for monetary policy operations to the effects representative of the private claims on the SME, communication by the banks of the scorings to the companies … Except that these decisions had no effect on the distribution of bank credit, which remains rebellious to all monetary policy measures adopted by the central bank for at least eight years. Indeed, the growth rate of bank credit fell by more than 50% in 2012, from + 10.55% in 2011 to + 4.7% the following year, then to an annual average of between + 2% and + 4%. from 2013 to 2019, mainly funded by ephemeral spot credits granted during the month of December of each year to financial companies, which are keen to embellish their net asset values ​​and who hasten to repay these credits the following month . Over the period 2012/2019, the total balance sheet of the banks increased by 347 billion dirhams, while the credits increased by 323 billion dirhams, of which 39 billion dirhams only for the equipment credits but a decrease of – DH 4 billion for equipment loans to manufacturing industries in a country which has a "Industrial acceleration plan"! There is no doubt that the damage is deep and that the demand for credit remains dependent before any other consideration, the restoration of confidence and the revival of private investment and consumption of durable goods by households. No doubt also that monetary policy has aggravated the situation by fishing by excessive rigor, giving the impression that it would be enough to use a teaspoon to empty an Olympic pool!

Bank Al Maghrib. AIC PRESS

In other heavens where the big central banks are working, solutions of a different scale have been favored. In the United States, the Fed has kept its key interest rate between 0% and 0.25% since December 2008, butDue to the overheating activity of the US economy, the policy rate was then gradually raised, reaching a range of 2.25% -2.50% in December 2018. In 2019, the US policy interest rate was reduced twice in 2 months (in July and September), reduced to 1.75% to support growth. In Euroland, the ECB has regularly changed the interest rate of the main refinancing operations in response to the effects of the economic crisis: 3.75% to 2.5% during the year 2008, 2% to 1% from 2009 to 2011, 0.75% in July 2012, 0.5 % in May 2013, 0.25% in November 2013, 0.15% in June 2014, 0.05% in September 2014 and 0.00% since March 2016. Today, banks are paying the ECB a negative interest of 0.50% for which they do not have immediate utility. Following the movement initiated by the American Fed, lrate of the Bank of England, set at 5.75% in July 2007, saw successive declines in the fall of 2007 to react to the context of the subprime crisis and the threats that weighed on the banking sector and on the entire British economy. Set at 4.5% in October 2008, the Bank of England's Official Bank Rate experienced successive monthly declines (50 to 100 basis points per month), reaching a minimum of 0 , 5% in March 2009, historically low level maintained unchanged until August 2018 when it was raised to 0.75% (rate maintained until now). The Swiss National Bank decided in September 2014 to keep its main policy rate, the three-month Libor, in a range of between 0% and 0.25%, against 2% -3% in October 2008. The key interest rate is currently – 0.75%. The key rate of the Bank of Japan has seen drastic declines since the 1990s to fight against the deep economic, financial and deflationary crisis. The Japanese Overnight Call Rate fell below the 3% threshold in 1993, then 2% and less than 1% in 1995, which will then never be crossed again. This reference rate reached 0.25% in September 1998 and even 0.0% from February 1999 to August 2000 and from March 2001 to July 2006. After a slight recovery to 0.25% in July 2006, then to 0.5 In February 2007, due to a relative but temporary economic upturn, the global crisis of 2008 forced the Bank of Japan (BoJ) to reduce its benchmark rate to 0.3% in autumn 2008 and to 0.1% in December of the same year, which level will then be maintained for the next 3 years, to fall again to a range of 0% -0.1% from October 2010. The BoJ currently applies an interest rate of 0% to -0.1%. Regarding the Bank of Canada, the banking and financial turmoil of the fall of 2008 forced it to repeatedly lower its key interest rate. The target for the overnight rate was reduced from 3% in early September 2008 to 2.5% a month later, 1.5% in early January 2009, 0.5% in March 2009 and 0.25% in April 2009. From the end of 2010, the The Bank of Canada's target rate has risen to 1% and has stabilized since then until 2018 (1.25% in January, 1.50% in July and 1.75% in October), due to relative good health. country's economy. The key rate of this country remains stable at 1.75% in September 2019.

But well above the key rates, which fell to almost 0% and sometimes even sailed in a negative zone, leading the economies concerned to a situation of liquidity traps, it is unconventional monetary policies that have been massively against the economic depression. Central banks have bought thousands of billions of dollars and euros in government bonds to bolster activity and fight deflation. On September 10, 2008, five days before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the US Federal Reserve held a US $ 480 billion portfolio of debt securities issued by the US Treasury. Five years later, on September 11, 2013, this amount reached 2.041 billion – an increase of 325% – which makes the US central bank, which now holds 17% of the negotiable public debt, the first creditor of the state government -United. Q.E. started in the US from 2008 until the end of 2014, while the normalization of the FED balance sheet started at the end of 2017. Q.E. the ECB started later. These are 2,600 billion euros of bonds (public debts and private bonds) that were acquired between March 2015 and December 2018. A new Q.E. expected to be launched by the ECB from November 2019 up to 20 billion euros per month, less than the previous one which covered 60 billion euros per month from March 2015 for 1 year, then 80 billion euros. euros per month from March 2016 and, finally, 30 billion euros per month from October 2017 to December 2018. The ECB and the Banque de France hold today a quarter of the French public debt.

As could easily be imagined, the Moroccan central bank did not use the unconventional Q-type monetary policy instruments. for, she says, not to expose oneself to a risk of inflation (forecast at 0.4% in 2019), forgetting a more deadly danger for the national economy, that of decay and unemployment. Bank al Maghrib's balance sheet evolved at a very modest pace, rising from MAD 227 billion in 2011 to MAD 313 billion in 2018. The central bank refused to buy public or private debt on the primary market, leaving banks alone to carry more than 140 billion dirhams of treasury bills in their balance sheets, thus creating a foreclosure effect on the financing of the real economy. The banks benefit from this because they prefer to invest in the public debt market, which generates a high return with no counterparty risk. But is it for the benefit of businesses and households? Surely, no!

A macro-prudential policy out of step with the reality of companies

The Moroccan central bank prides itself on enforcing the so-called Basel III prudential regulations. It is in error because this regulation is totally unsuited to the reality of our economic fabric, dominated by fragile and under-capitalized SMEs. Applying Basel III before successfully upgrading companies is putting the cart before the horse. The recapitalization needs brought about by the new Basel III regulatory requirements will disrupt banking activity and create an unprecedented crowding out effect on the economic and social fabric. Our issuing institution must better appreciate the risks inherent in regulatory copy and paste, a normative production inspired by Anglo-Saxon central bankers strongly imbued with a financial culture dominated by disintermediation. He must better understand the reality of the business of a bank, its constraints, its customers. It must better perceive what would be the collateral damage of a banking regulation out of phase, autistic to the fragilities of the companies, which would accelerate the defaults rather than prevent them, which would favor the destruction of the jobs rather than protect them. It must carry out a better assessment of the consequences of the prudential reform and adopt a more adequate implementation schedule, by applying a moratorium to stop the haemorrhage of the shortcomings of the SEVTs, whose mortality exceeded the threshold of 8,000 units in 2017. SMEs taking full advantage of the consequences of an oligopolistic banking sector where the balance of power is clearly unfavorable to them: almost usurious debtor interest rates, excessive billing and transaction fees, real and personal guarantees required to excess, dictate pricing and risk premium …

Some examples, among others, of inconsistencies in the prudential regulation of Basel III, which Bank al Maghrib applies with docility. Le ratio de levier limitant l’endettement des banques (le total des expositions bilan &amp  hors bilan ne devant pas excéder 33 fois le capital tiers one) réduira la taille des bilans bancaires, limitera la fonction bancaire de financement à la simple “origination”  des crédits et incitera les banques à ne conserver dans leur bilan qu’une partie réduite de leurs créances sur les clients, les encourageant à procéder à une titrisation massive. Les deux ratios de liquidité (à court terme et long terme) limiteront la fonction de transformation, en pénalisant la détention d’actifs de maturité longue, alors que cette fonction est essentielle pour une économie en émergence où les ménages ont une préférence pour les placements liquides et où les besoins d’investissements à long terme sont considérables. Les banques seront contraintes de maintenir dans leur bilan un volume important d’actifs liquides (trésorerie, titres souverains), comme de se défaire des crédits à long terme aux entreprises et des crédits octroyés aux opérateurs les moins bien notés (PME &amp  TPE). Les normes comptables IFRS avec leur concept de “fairvalue” , présentent une pro-cyclicité qui est totalement inadaptée pour le dimensionnement des capitaux réglementaires à l’origine de la production des prêts bancaires et des polices d’assurance.

Ce qui est encore plus regrettable pour notre pays, c’est notre naïveté à appliquer des règles que d’autres ont su éviter. Les inspirateurs de cette réglementation prudentielle, les banquiers centraux anglo-saxons, ont déjà trouvé les moyens de s’y dérober. D’abord, en faisant en sorte que le financement de leur économie s’oriente davantage vers les marchés financiers. Le financement des entreprises est totalement « intermédié » au Maroc, les banques représentant plus de 99 % de ce financement, contre 80 % en zone euro et à peine 40 % aux États-Unis. Toute réglementation bancaire draconienne aura donc forcément des répercussions plus lourdes au Maroc que dans d’autres pays, où les marchés boursiers jouent un rôle substitutif. Ensuite, le shadow banking qui contribue de plus en plus fortement au financement de l’économie mondiale, tout en échappant aux bilans des banques et donc à la règlementation macro-prudentielle dont il se nourrit. Ce sont les banques d’affaires, les hedge funds, les fonds de titrisation, les fonds monétaires, les fonds de pension, d’assurance-vie, les fonds négociés en Bourse…  Ce sont aussi, les entreprises de capital-investissement, les sociétés de garantie de crédit, les trusts de gestion d’actifs (notamment immobiliers), les sociétés d’affacturage, les sites de crowdfunding, les plateformes de monnaies virtuelles …  Estimée par le Conseil de stabilité financière (FSB – Financial Stability Board) à plus de 92.000 milliards de dollars en 2017, cette « finance de l’ombre » représente aujourd’hui un quart des actifs financiers mondiaux, la moitié du poids du système bancaire traditionnel et au moins l’équivalent du PIB mondial annuel. Mais que représente-t-elle au Maroc ? Pratiquement rien !

Une incapacité à transformer le modèle de l’industrie bancaire

Il est de bon ton de se féliciter de la bonne santé des banques, qui contribueraient, dit-on, à la résilience de l’économie nationale. Les profits bancaires ont dépassé le seuil de 11 milliards de dirhams en 2018, suivant une progression annuelle régulière. Il est légitime de s’interroger sur le secret de tels profits, alors même que l’économie marocaine subit une crise majeure. Comment les banques réussissent-elles ce tour de prestidigitation en augmentant leur PNB et en maintenant leurs résultats au moment où la croissance économique est en berne, la consommation des ménages est atone, les défaillances d’entreprises se multiplient, la balance du commerce extérieur se détériore, l’endettement public se creuse et la situation financière des entreprises publiques se dégrade ? En fait, c’est dans les limites du modèle même de l’industrie bancaire qu’il faut trouver les éléments de réponse à ce « miracle bancaire », et c’est l’incapacité de la banque centrale à transformer ce modèle qu’il faut interroger.

Abdellatif Jouahri, Gouverneur de Bank Al-Maghrib, lors d'un point de presse sur les décisions du Conseil de la Banque en matière de conduite de la politique monétaire. MOHAMED DRISSI KAMILI / LE DESK

Cinq facteurs expliquent le phénomène de l’immunité des profits bancaires. Premièrement, la prédominance d’une situation oligopolistique, où les trois premiers groupes bancaires donnent le la à leur profession en contrôlant près des 2/3 du marché. Deuxièmement, le niveau de la marge d’intermédiation bancaire qui est sanctuarisée. Au fil des années, la marge bancaire s’est stabilisée à un niveau élevé eu égard au contexte économique et aux capacités d’endettement et de remboursement des entreprises et des particuliers. La marge d’intérêt a représenté en moyenne 2.98 % en 2018 (contre 3.15 %, 3.13 %, 3.21 %, 3.25 % et 3.18 % respectivement en 2017, 2015, 2012, 2010 et 2008) et a généré plus de 32 milliards de dirhams de produits nets soit 72 % environ du PNB global du secteur bancaire (47.2 milliards de DH en 2018). La marge globale d’intermédiation bancaire n’a subi aucune inflexion significative en une décennie. Troisièmement, l’insuffisante réglementation de la facturation de commissions bancaires, qui représentent 7.3 milliards de DH en 2018 (contre 2.1 milliards de DH en 2004), soit 15 % du PNB sectoriel. La tarification est intervenue progressivement sans les garanties de transparence à l’égard des clients, et plus spécialement des plus fragiles d’entre eux que sont les TPME et les particuliers, et sans que la contrepartie réglementaire de cette mesure n’ait été décidée, à savoir la rémunération des dépôts à vue. L’attitude conciliante de la banque centrale à l’égard de la tarification bancaire et l’absence d’associations de défense des consommateurs, pérennisent ce déséquilibre. Quatrièmement, le gentleman agreement entre l’État et le système bancaire, le premier faisant appel au second pour financer sa dette abyssale, le second trouvant auprès du premier une attitude accommodante par des refinancements monétaires bon marché et sans condition de réemploi. Enfin, cinquièmement, le degré excessif d’intermédiation bancaire du financement de l’économie, qui donne un pouvoir exorbitant aux banquiers et marginalise les autres opérateurs du marché financier.

La banque centrale marocaine surveille les mécanismes de création monétaire comme le lait sur le feu. Elle refuse de faire usage de la planche à billets, pour sauvegarder la valeur de la monnaie nationale, contenir le risque inflationniste et assurer la stabilité financière. Ce principe est louable, car il ne s’agit en aucune manière de confondre création monétaire et création de richesses, celle-ci requérant des réformes plus structurelles en lien avec la déficience du système éducatif et de la formation professionnelle, l’insuffisance de la recherche, la faiblesse du tissu industriel, la rigidité des règles sur le marché du travail, l’inefficience des administrations publiques, la survivance d’une économie de rente… Si la banque centrale a raison sur le fond, elle doit néanmoins prendre garde à ne pas transformer sa toute-puissance en impuissance, son excès de rigueur en aveuglement et sa crédibilité en discours convenu. Une politique monétaire doit être mise au service de la politique économique d’un pays. Elle doit en amplifier les effets attendus, et non les contrarier. Elle doit accompagner la réalité d’une économie et agir pour la transformer, et non l’ignorer. Entre rigueur et laxisme, le chemin est vaste et il n’y a aucune autre alternative pour la banque centrale que de trouver le bon dosage en transformant sa politique monétaire et macro-prudentielle. Car si l’inflation est une menace qui habite les esprits  et bien, il y a une autre non moins funeste, c’est la panne de croissance économique. Si quelque chose est plus lugubre que la dévaluation de notre monnaie nationale, c’est l’arrivée de cohortes de jeunes diplômés chômeurs sans aucun espoir d’avenir. L’urgence du débat sur la politique monétaire et macro-prudentielle est là. Celle de l’action aussi, pour absoudre les sept péchés capitaux de la banque centrale.