in search of the third position

"I am saying that we have to have a mature relationship (with the United States), but we also have to understand that Argentina has always found its first link in Europe and we have to turn our eyes back to Europe." Far from the usual refundational rhetoric of emerging political leaderships in democratic Argentina, Alberto Fernández on tour, who faces the prospect of a government in which he must deal with Donald Trump at the head of the government of the first world power, embarked on a Multifunctional economic conflict with the emergence of China, and with Jair Bolsonaro in the presidency of our main partner, he pointed to Europe as a privileged partner of Argentina to build its international insertion. At a time when US officials threaten even the government of their most reliable ally in the region in relation to their sovereign decisions, and the Bolsonaro government flirts with the idea of ​​developing nuclear weapons, Alberto Fernández's statements recall Alberdi's warnings : "The dangers for the Spanish Republics are not Europe. They are in America: they are Brazil on one side and the United States on the other. These powers are what can attack their independence, not Europe."

Indeed, the Alberdian principle was a constant throughout national history, with very few exceptions, and with more force than the changes of ideological sign. The policy of conservatives, since the eighties of the nineteenth century, meant the commercial insertion of Argentina as a member of the British informal empire, which provided about 40% of its meat imports, and also included important associations with Germany and France. With the United States, on the other hand, the relationship was one of rivalry. The Argentine government has always been suspicious of the Monroe Doctrine and its postulate, "America for the Americans," which it considered an excuse to legitimize expansionist policies in the continent. The scheme was maintained with democratic reform and the coming to power of radicalism, and, Roca Runciman pact through, after the first coup d'etat and the return of conservatives.

The Second World War brought new sources of conflict with the United States, due to the Argentine decision to maintain neutrality between the allies and the Nazi army, until the final moments of the war, when luck was finally cast. This attitude contrasted with the active participation of Brazil in the Allied side, and it would be worth it to Argentina, in times of the Marshall Plan, American trade sanctions that would last until 1949. Also from that time is the famous "Braden or Perón", that campaign presidential in which the US ambassador occupied an active leadership role for a sector of society, and was defeated by popular majorities.

While Argentina was always perceived, ultimately, as a Western country during the Cold War, the relationship with the United States was not harmonious in the following years. The attempt of the Frondizi government to mediate between Cuba and the United States was the point of greatest tension in a policy that, except in the brief internship of José María Guido, was never alignment. The Argentine position would contrast with that of Brazil, until the early 1970s the most reliable US ally in the region. It would also be the years of the "Brazilian miracle." Times of extraordinary growth in the neighboring country that would definitely leave behind any economic symmetry between this and Argentina. During these decades, Europe would remain a privileged destination for Argentine exports, of which about 60% went to their markets. The creation of the European Community and the Common Agricultural Policy would dramatically reduce that percentage, a reminder that in global trade not only the policies of each country count, but that others play, and be left out, while others are integrated, has also consequences.

Nor did the last dictatorship, whose arrival had the active blessing of Washington, managed to consolidate a stable alignment with the United States. Tensions with the Jimmy Carter government over human rights violations, and the ratification of trade agreements signed with the socialist bloc during the Peronist government led to paradoxical results. The Soviet Union would become Argentina's first trading partner after the country did not join the US-led cereal boycott after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. And if, upon arrival, Galtieri promised a much greater disciplined alignment with the American country, the Falklands War left any project that was in that direction truncated.

Alfonsín found a country that, for the first time, faced decisively the weight of external indebtedness, and the challenge of facing redemocratization when military regimes were still maintained in neighboring countries. The traditional independence of Argentine foreign policy led Alfonsin to face the Reagan government on some issues such as the policy towards Sandinista Nicaragua. Under these conditions, the radical president tried to build bases of support from affinity between continental European social democratic governments. He found understanding and verbal support for redemocratization, but economically the European response was the same as the American. Requests for pro-market reforms and structural adjustments. Also of Alfonsín's time is the end of the rivalry with Brazil, with agreements in commercial, political and nuclear matters.

The arrival of Carlos Menem gave rise to the first long period of alignment with the United States. In a world that had become unipolar, the justicialist government extreme gestures in search of political and economic support. The "Washington Consensus", the Argentine participation in the Gulf War, the condemnations of Cuba at the United Nations, were some of the most striking. However, investments in the open sectors after privatizations came mainly from Europe. Capitals of the continent, mainly Spanish, but also French and Italian were left with the lion's share in the distribution of the cake.

The implosion of 2001, the economic crisis and the end of convertibility also put an end to the project conceived by Menem and continued by Fernando De la Rúa. Nestor Kirchner left several of the key clauses of public service contracts signed during the Menemism, and his government and Cristina Fernández's government even faced some restatements, such as home water service, radioelectric space and, the most contentious, the one of Aerolineas Argentinas and Fiscal Oilfields. The decade of 2000 was the rise of China, which became the first or second trading partner of each of the countries in the region, and the relationship with Brazil, with some successful political balances, was well below the potential, even with related governments, in economic matters.

With the United States, relations went from coldness, with collaboration on specific and strategic issues for the US government, to the open confrontation in the last Kirchner government.

Alberto Fernández's express mention of Europe as a privileged interlocutor in Argentina's relations with the world recognizes an ancient historical root, but points to the needs of the near future. The last Kirchnerist governments, and the Macri government, coincided with a loss of European prominence at the international level. The growing Sino-American bipolarity, helplessness in the face of the 2008 crisis and the rise of europhobic nationalism called into question the integration project. A project that the Franco-German axis tries, not without difficulties, to relaunch, accompanied by leaders such as Pedro Sánchez, and the expansionary monetary policy of the European Central Bank.

Europe appears as an intermediate road to travel from a country surrounded by the double dependence of China and the United States, in times of intensification of the confrontation between the two powers, in a framework in which the regional association faces enormous challenges. The obstacles, however, are also evident. As it happened during the Alfonsin government, hardly Argentina finds in Europe, outside a kinder tone, a greater understanding than it finds in the United States, something that is otherwise evident, in light of the treatment received by the countries of the United States. South of the continent during its economic crises.

It will also be difficult to find large investments in the old continent. Vaca Muerta, the biggest promise of the national economy, is a type of exploitation, unconventional, in which European companies are located behind American, Russian and Chinese companies. There is also, in addition, mutual distrust of the hydrocarbons sector since the expropriation of Repsol's actions in YPF, which was revealed after Fernandez's often justified statements about the actions of multinationals.

With mutual and complex red lines, which were revealed in the negotiations for the Mercosur – European Union agreement, and structural difficulties for the relationship, the convergent needs, the historical affinities and the capacity of the political leaders will be key to navigating a relationship whose potential has the measure of the risks of betting on it.