Bechis rejects the Mes: "The European Union saves all the banks except ours in crisis"

For ten years theItaly pays the financial crises of other euro area states and even other banks in those countries. Rome had to pass out for the Greece, but also for the Spain, theIreland, Cyprus and the Portugal. According to the data of the last economic bulletin of the Bank of Italy the financial support offered by the Italian government to the other euro area countries is weighed on the Italian public debt for 58.2 billion euros while the liabilities connected to the loans granted by the 'ESFS, the community body then transformed into Mes, a total of 33.9 billion euros. With all that money we have granted loans to Greece, helped the Spanish, Irish and even Cyprus banks, and helped Portugal endure financial costs far in excess of the remuneration of the loans granted, which certainly being such must (but not always) be returned . On a scales plate there is therefore the forced donation of the blood of the Italians.
On the other side of compensation, not only is there really nothing real, but even something less than nothing: in times of need, instead of giving thanks, low blows came from the other countries that lead the euro.
If this picture is not present, it becomes difficult to understand the political tug-of-war and the thousands of daily controversies of these days on the signature that the Italian Prime Minister, Giuseppe Conte, has already secretly promised to put on the reform of the Mes. The European stability mechanism is the continuation in another form of the State Savings Fund which was the first in Esfs, and to its capital Italy participates through 14.3 billion euros already paid. But there are not only these funds, because the Mes has a firepower already established for intervention in financial crises of just under 705 billion euros, and of this sum 125 billion and 395.9 million euros must be put available from Italy through special issues of government bonds and thus increasing its public debt, exactly as happened in these years. The figures are enormous, the problem is that in the MES mechanism it is also foreseen to whom the possible aid can be immediately provided, to whom to provide them under certain conditions and to whom they cannot be disbursed. From the drafts of the text already approved by Conte and the then Minister of the Economy, Giovanni Tria – despite the diametrically opposed mandate both from the then green-yellow majority and from the PD which was in opposition – clearly emerges that if Italy should needing that help would fall into the third category of countries (they would say no and that's enough), and at best in the second category that would require the automatic debt restructuring according to lines provided by a new troyka to have those loans automatically Summits of the Mes, European Commission and IMF. In fact, if the texts do not change, Italy would be forced to donate its blood to others once again, without ever seeing a return of the favor in the event of its financial crisis (for example because it was under attack from the markets).
The 200 billion euros are therefore clear, some of which have already cost and in part will cost us financial aid to states and banks of other euro countries, but when it was Italy that needed a helping hand, that is happened? The facts are obvious. In the midst of the financial crisis of the summer of 2011, a penny did not come from Europe to the rescue, but Mario Monti and Elsa Fornero gave us a huge new forced collection of blood from the arms of the tax payers. They even punished us for being generous with others. Even worse was when the Italian banking system needed help – not even sensational. In crisis, a large bank like MPS, two medium-large banks such as the Veneto and a series of smaller banks, including Tercas (a former savings bank in Teramo) and the four small banks involved in the 2015 resolution decree: Banca delle Marche, Cassa di Chieti, Cassa di Ferrara and Banca popolare dell'Etruria.
In all these cases, not only did a penny of help not come from the EU's financial funds, but illegitimate and expensive troubles, all registered by the Commission, fell on them. In the case of Tercas and the Cassa di Ferrara, an entirely internal aid was found with the Bank of Italy, that of the interbank guarantee fund set up as an internal solidarity insurance by Italian banks which are all private.
Blatantly, in both cases, the intervention of the interbank fund was rejected by the European commission, unlawfully labeling it as public intervention. In the case of Tercas there was an appeal to the European Court of First Instance which in the first instance has already issued a sentence in favor of Italy, banning the European Commission 's tense intervention. In the case of Cariferrara, unfortunately the current capital increase was lifted and the bank was terminated together with the other three. But even on that decree the European institutions, instead of helping Italy, unjustifiably damaged it. Why the competition commissioner Margrethe Vestager imposed a resolution of 17.5% of the value of the four banks' non-performing loans, a figure significantly lower than the one a few years or months previously established for the Irish and Slovenian banks (the lowest value reached was 22 %), and decidedly lower than the market valuations at that time in Italy for similar transactions (very close to 30%), with the exception of a single mysterious acquisition of Fonspa, which was instead taken as a reference by the EU.
In short, it was the unjustified choice of Vestager to create the vast range of "cheated savers", who between various controversies and governments were then reimbursed (and are being repaid) by the Italian State's coffers with an outlay of slightly less to 2 billion. So: they take money from us, and a lot of money. When we need it, not only do they turn a deaf ear, but they cause us 2 billion in damage. And why should we still give them to them based on the experience of these years?

by Franco Bechis