Does the departure of the United Kingdom call into question the future of the European Union?

This is the (nth) meeting of the (maybe) last chance. On Thursday 17 October, a two-day European summit in Brussels will open a new opportunity for the EU to seek an agreement between the EU and the UK on Brexit. In the absence of consensus on a text by Saturday 19, a law will require Prime Minister Boris Johnson to request a second postponement of Brexit, scheduled for October 31 … unless he chooses not to respect it and rush his country towards a "no deal". Whatever the ups and downs that the future holds, it seems certain that these three years of procrastination will not have done any good in the image of the United Kingdom. Nor to his political class, more divided than ever.

But what about the European Union? How will it recover from what appeared in 2016 as a cataclysm, and the difficult discussions that followed? Did the idea of ​​Europe take a hit in the battle? Franceinfo asked political scientist Thierry Chopin, a special adviser at the Jacques Delors Institute, a pro-European think tank, and a professor of political science at the Catholic University of Lille (Espol).

Franceinfo: In a few weeks, the United Kingdom could leave the European Union. Is the arrival of this often delayed conclusion good news for the other Member States?

Thierry Chopin: No, Brexit is bad news. For the EU, the departure of the United Kingdom is an amputation. It is losing a large member country, which has certainly slowed or even prevented certain developments, but which has contributed to the European project economically, with the deepening of the single market, and which has been a support for enlargement. Financially, it is a country that was a major contributor to the common budget. And from a strategic point of view, the United Kingdom has attributes of power, such as nuclear weapons or its permanent seat on the UN Security Council, which are important in a context where the European Union seeks to influence the international scene.

For all these reasons, no, that's not good news. But that's no longer the question: I do not see how we could escape it.Thierry Chopinat franceinfo

In their negotiations with London, do you feel that the other 27 member states have joined together?

Without a doubt. We can only note their cohesion at the governmental level. They agreed unanimously on the mandate given to the chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, which was not at all clear in advance – some states traditionally close to the United Kingdom could have expressed positions divergent. The United Kingdom is thus Ireland's third largest economic partner for exports, the third for the Netherlands, the second for Poland …

London also has a form of ideological proximity with the Netherlands or the Scandinavian countries on what the European Union should be in terms of internal market, free trade … And the British have sometimes been perceived as exercising a function balance between the Franco-German couple and countries less favorable to the EU's federal integration project (such as those in Central Europe, Sweden or Denmark). However, these countries close to the United Kingdom have not accepted concessions in the negotiations, and instead have helped to maintain the red lines.

Brexit has helped bring these countries closer to other Member States?

In my opinion, there was an awareness that their primary interest was to preserve the integrity of the internal market and the four freedoms that are inseparable (circulation of goods, capital, services and people). Moreover, the cohesion of the 27 is also explained by the fact that the balance of power is favorable to them. The negotiating context reminded them that the union is their strength, that their joint economic and commercial strength gives them an asset in the discussions both with the United Kingdom and with the external powers.

The contrast between this unity and the inner disunity in the United Kingdom is striking.Thierry Chopinat franceinfo

There is also a political argument for some states: the desire not to suggest that the strategy of the brexiters can be a winner, by giving the United Kingdom finally a status as beneficial as that of a Member State. This may explain, for example, the firm position of the Netherlands, where some populist and even extremist parties have sought to capitalize on the Europhobic discourse.

We interviewed you in 2016, just after the British vote. At the time, you were talking about, without being convinced yourself, the possibility that the success of the British referendum "broke a taboo" and that Europhobes can benefit from it in other countries. It seems that this has not been verified: why?

When we look at opinion polls at the European level, we see a very interesting effect of Brexit: over the medium-long term, public opinion has become more favorable to the European Union. Three years ago, 52% of respondents thought that their country's membership of the EU was a good thing (according to the Eurobarometer of the European Parliament) ; in September 2018, they were 62%. When we ask the Europeans how they would vote if a referendum was organized at home, in no member country there is an absolute majority in favor of the exit, not even in countries governed by Eurosceptic political forces. The eurosceptic speech remains strong, but does it lead to wanting to leave the EU? No.

How do you explain this evolution of opinion?

We can see that the discourse of the Eurosceptic parties has changed. In 2017, the FN, for example, was really taking a speech inspired by that of Nigel Farage (then leader of the Europhobe party Ukip) in the United Kingdom, speaking of giving back to France the control of its destiny, and its monetary, legislative, territorial or even economic sovereignty. The success of brexiters supported the idea that the process of European integration was not irreversible, and the context of multiple crises highlighted weaknesses in the EU, particularly in the face of the migratory crisis, which the Eurosceptics were then striving to exploit. .

But the Eurosceptic parties have abandoned the reference to an exit strategy as the negotiations with the United Kingdom have become complicated and they have found that it was not paying off electorally. Several elements explain that Brexit is not a mobilizing theme in the electorate. First, the political and economic uncertainty it produces. Negotiations between Brussels and London show that getting out of the EU is not so easy and can cost a lot on both counts.

The internal political crisis in the United Kingdom also seems to serve as a counter-model: British politics is the best (or worst) series of the moment.Thierry Chopinat franceinfo

In addition, a central theme in the pro-Brexit campaign in the UK was immigration, one of the topics that produces the most euroscepticism. But opinion studies show that a majority considers that the regulation of migratory flows should rather pass through solutions at European level, even if it is less the case in the countries of central and eastern Europe . Parties that have abandoned the Brexit-inspired strategy seem to be returning to these questions.

Still, one of the most powerful countries in the European Union is doing everything to leave it. Does this not undermine the image of European construction?

The case of the United Kingdom has always been specific. British Euroscepticism is anchored in a long tradition. Opposition to UK participation in the EU was already high in the 1970s when compared to other Member States. Eurobarometer data show that a majority of Britons have considered, almost continuously for over thirty years, that their country does not benefit from its participation in the EU. From a more identity perspective, they consider themselves to be very little European, compared to the European average. I do not think that their desire to leave the European Union is indicative of the weakness of the European Union. It is rather the result of a national peculiarity.

The European project still seemed to be based on an idea that its merits were self-evident, and that it was natural to go for ever more enlargement and integration. Is not it harmed by Brexit?

I am not at all sure that the questioning on the European project is linked only to Brexit. The vocation to expand has been called into question since the mid-2000s. When France and the Netherlands rejected the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, the rejection of enlargement was one of the arguments in favor of the "no" vote. Similarly, the idea of ​​closer integration, or even a federal Europe, is not shared by the majority of states – there are doubts strong enough since the 1990s – and here again the question seems to have been decided by the 2005 referendums. It is a project on which we have already visibly returned.

Does Brexit change anything to the vision of the future of the European Union? Can she continue as before?

I see three scenarios. The choice of the British, combined with ten years of political crises, "sovereignty shocks" that hit the EU – crisis of the euro zone, Ukraine, terrorist threat, migration crisis – could have led to fragmentation or even implosion of the Union. But the opposite has happened.

Resilience has been found to overcome these crises and bring Member States closer together.Thierry Chopinat franceinfo

Another scenario, more ambitious politically, would be to bring out of these shocks a stronger political power, and to rethink the joint exercise of certain sovereign powers, in the field of the regulation of migratory flows, diplomacy and defense, or taxation. But this affects the sovereignty of states, and they must be unanimously approved. It is difficult to act in this way other than by introducing different levels of integration.

The last scenario is that of a status quo, a Union perhaps a little consolidated, but not more. It seems to me to be the most realistic because it is the one that requires the least political will, and therefore the most tempting for many politicians. But personally, I find this option risky: the European political system has shown that it works well in calm weather, but it is not suited to crises. Of course, under the pressure of events and necessity, decisions are made, but how slowly! This produces a lot of uncertainty. This crisis management by the governments of the member states poses significant problems of efficiency and political legitimacy. However, the EU is facing increasingly frequent shocks. How long can she hold like this?